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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HENRY EARLEY, ) 
Responden'• ) 
vs. ) Case No. 7725 
KARL L. JACKSON• ) 
AppeUant. ) 
RESPONDENT'S PETI~ION FOR 
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRI:IsF 
The plaintiff and respondent in the 
above captione-d case, on the grounds and 
for the reasons hereinafter stated, ra-
apectfully petitions the above court for 
a rehearing in this case and recaueata that 
the court vacate and set aside the order and 
judgment of tr-~is court reversing the judgment 
ot the lower court. 
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POINT 1. The court has erroneoual7 
based its decision on the ground that the 
driver of the appellant's ear was con• 
fronted w1 th an emergency of the respondent's 
making. In so doing 1 t has oompletel7 
oYerlooked m~terial eY1dence in the case 
trom which the jury could have found that 
the driver ot the appellant~s car never 
saw the respondent's parked.vehicle an4 
accordingly could net be confronted with 
any emergency in attempting to avoid a 
collision with it. 
POINT 2. The court in holding that 
the driver of the appe1lant•s car was not 
able to determine the presence of the park eel 
truck until he was within 250•'300 feet ot 
it has completely overlooked the provisions 
I 
ot Section 5?·7-196 (a), Utah Code Annotated, 
and eases ot this court decided thereunder. 
POINT 3. The court has misconstrued 
the facts and the law in holding that the 
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respondent d8liberately ran into the eourae 
of the appellant's vehicle and placed him• 
selt in the path which that vehicle would 
have to take in avoiding a collision with 
the respondent's truck. 
\VHEREFORE. pet! t1oner prays that he 
be granted a rehearing in this oause and 
that the matter be set down for further 
argument and that on such hearing the court 
set aside and vacate its £ormer judgment 
and decision tiled herein and enter herein 
a decision affirming the deeision of the 
lower court. 
RICH & STRONG 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PBTITION 
FOR REliEARING 
It clearlJ. appears from the opinion that 
this court did not have in mind all of the 
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material tacts and evidence at the time ot 
making its decision. Important evidenoe 
has been completely and w'h.olly overlooked. 
Such e'rldence, which the ju!7' oould have 
bel18Yed,. supports the judgment o~ the 
lower court. The interests of our client 
and the ends of justice require that the 
record in this case1 and particularly the 
portions herein mentioned, be reexamined and 
the case reheard. 
POIN'l' 1. 
THE COURT HAS ERRONEOUSLY BASED I'TS · 
DECISION ON THE FACT THAT THE DRIVER OF 
THE APPELLANT'S CAR WAS OONFROlrrED Vi!TH AW 
EMEal.GENCY OF THE RESPONDE!TT'S MAKING. IN SO 
DOING IT HAS COMPLETELY OVERLOOKED li1AfERIJ\L 
EVIDENCE IN THE CASE FROM \VtiiCH Tit.~ JURY 
COULD HAVE FOUND THAT THE DRIVER OF THE 
APPELLANT'S CAR lt:EVER SAW THE P ... ESPOI\fT.JENT'S 
PARKED VEHICLE AND ACCORDINGLY COULD NOT BE 
CONFRONTED ~i~"IT'H ANY lJIIERGENCY IN ATr.r:EM:PT!lfG 
TO AVOID A COLLISION WITH IT. 
This court by its opinion has held that 
the driver or the appellant's oar was con• 
fl'onted with an emergency of the respondent's 
own makingJ that by reason thereof his 
attention was directed on the respondent's 
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stalled truck and 1n getting eately around itJ 
that the driver had to swerve to the north 
and was excused trom earlier ascertaining 
the respondent t s presence on the north edge 
of the h1ghwq. All of this assumes that 
the driver of the appellant's truck aaw the 
respondent's sta1led vehicle blocking the 
south side ot the z-oad. True, the d:Piver 
of the appellant's truck did testify that 
he saw the vehicle when he was within 000 
or 300 teet of it and turned to the left 
to avoid it. However, there was other 
material evidence in the case on this uoint 
.,_ 
Whieh has been completely ove~loolted 'b7 
this court. Harold Johnson. one of the 
persons who arrived on the scene shortly 
following the accident. testified that 
tollow·ing the acoident the driver of the 
appellant's truck in his presence stated 
that he had not seen the r~sRondent's trucfi 
~t all, but had just seen the respondent out 
waving his bands, (R. 184, 186). !here was, 
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accordingly, a eon.fllot in the evidenoo on 
this potnt. It was for the jury to determine 
whether the facts wore as testified to by 
the driver at the trial or whether Johrls011 7 S 
testimony abon-fj the driver's staternent made 
in Jorlllson's presence after ·the accident 
occurred wa~ true. For the purpose or this 
appeal the cotll"t must bear in mind that the 
jU%7 under the -evide·nee could well have 
found that the driver of the appellant's 
• 
truck never saw the respondent's truck at 
all• but merel7 saw the r«spondent on the 
highws.y waving_ his arm•. SUeh being the 
case, the driver c-ould not r)ossibly b.a,,e 
been con~~nted with an emergency. The 
emergency, it any, could only be based on 
knowledge that the s.ou.th half of the highway 
was blocked by the respondent's truck. With• 
out such knowledge, the presence or the 
truck was wholl7 immaterial and could not 
be used as an excuse for the appellant's 
car awel'ving to the left into the respondent 
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or tor the failing of the drivor to ascertain 
the respondent's presence upon the higtrrray. 
Under this theory- of the case we simply l1ave 
the respondent running in a \vest~8l11 l~r direction 
down the north edge of the highway, ti-!e 
appellant's truck being operated in an 
aastarly direction on the noutl1 ,side of 
the '}l.i.ghway, and the appellant's d.ri ver 
failing to see the respondent unt:tl he was 
too close. The~, in his cxcitementt he 
suddenly applied the brakes, causing the 
tru~k to skid out of control, swe1-.,re to 
the north and strike \the respondent on the 
nortb edge of the paved road. If the 
driver of the appallant's truck did not 
see the respondent's vehicle, but merely 
saw the ~espondent on the north edga or the 
road, we submit tb.at there 13 no justtficat1on 
whatsoever for the appellant' a truelt sw~T,ing 
to the north and striking the respondent. 
The negligence of tb.e truck dl?iver :tr1 tailing 
• f" 
to have his vohicle under cont~ol, under suoh 
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circumstances, would be the sole proximate 
cause or the acciden'• 
POINT 2. 
THE COUR'!' IN HOLDING THAT Tlf}i; DRIVER OF 
'l.HE APPkl:.LA-lfT'S CAR WAS NOT ABLE TO DJ~TlmMI}TE 
THE PRESI~TCE OF THE HlRKB'D TRUCK UNTIL !IE 
1:JAS ~1ITHIN 250•300 F3ET OF IT 1-IAS COMPL1~TEr .. Y~­
OVT!RLOOKED THE PROVISIOl{S OF SECTION 57•7•198 
(a), UTAH CODE ANNOT~\'l'ED• AND CASES OF THIS 
COURT DECIDED THER&\JNDER. 
This court in the opinion sets torth 
"that the driver (of appellant'·s truck) was 
not able to determine until he was within 
250--300 teet of the parked tr·uck that 
it was obstructing the entire lane ot his 
side of tratric." This again is the testimony ·~ 
given b7 the driver of the appellant's truck. 
but the distance at which he actually saw the 
truck is not the same as the distance at which 
he should haTe observed 1 ts presence upon 
the highway. Section 5?·7-198 (a), Utah 
Code Annotated, requires that every vehicle 
shall be equipped with ·head~ights ot such 
intensity on high beam "gs to reveal p•rson~ 
and vehicles at a distance o£ at least 350 
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feet ahead tor sll co~ditions of ~oadi~·" 
. 
The driver of the appellant's truok testitied 
that his headlights were burning on high 
beam. (R. 253.) •. There was no oneoming 
traffic or obstructions to vis-ion, (R. 265, 
268, 282). Accordingly, by statute, he 
should have been able to detect the presence 
of the truck and a so the respondent's pytasenee 
on the highway nt a distance of at least 350 
feet from each. In connection with an. earlier 
version of tnia statute this court has held 
that it is the duty or an operator to have 
a vehicle equipped with headlights ae 
required b:r statute ant!. to keep such eol'ltrol 
ot his car as w111 enable him to stop and 
avoid obstl'tlctions that :f'a.ll within the 
range of his vision. See D,al.,lez ys,.. !A:id .. 
~estern D~irz Products Co!!JPanz, ,e.t al, 80 
Utah 331, ar:d 11i~oleropoulos .vs. Rams"ez~ 
61 Utah 4G5. 
Th.e driver or the appellant's truck 
should, ther·et'ora, have detected the presence 
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ot the parked tlt'ltok on 1he highway at a 
distance of at least 350 feet and should 
have been able to stop prio~ to re.a·ebing 
the pa~ked truok. If, as we have seen 
in our disou.ssion under Point l, the clr:tver 
of ep pellant 's truck did not see the 
presence of the respondent's tl'.uek, then 
. 
there was nothing to d!st~aot his attention, 
even under the reasoning or this coll!'t, and 
he most ee~tainly should have seen respondent's 
pi-esence on the highway at a distance of 
at least 350 feet. Under. eithe:r theory the 
driver of appellant's trt1ck should have been 
able to atop be.fore reaching the pal'ked tl'uek 
or before striking respondent, and tl1era 
was no reason tor the sudden sw~rving or 
the appellant's truek so as to strike the 
respondent on the no1.,th edge of the ~oad. 
POINT 3. 
THE COUR'!' !!AS MISC01'TSTRUED THE FACTS 
A!~ID THE LllW IN HOLDI1TG THAT Tlfri! RESPOND~JT 
DELIBERAT~T_.Y R.A~N INTO THE COURSB OF THE 
APPELLANT'S VEHICLE A1\TD PLACED lii~.ISEL.B, Il~ 
T1r~ P.~TH WHICH THAT VEHICLE ~~tOUl,D 1IAVE TO 
TAKE Ill AVOIDilTG il OOLLISIOrT \7I:fH THE; 
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'!'his court in 1 ts opinion has held that 
the respondent deliberately ran into the 
course or the oncoming vehicle. This is not 
a correct app~ication of' the av~_dence in the 
ease. As indicated by the cou.rt in its 
opinion, the evidence most favorable to the· 
respondent would pla~e him on the north 
edge or the paved portion of the rdghway. 
There was also evidence f?om which the jury 
could determine that the appell$nt t s trttck 
was on the. south side ot the highway ?!l~1.en 
the brakes were first applied, (R. 219). 
Had the appellant's truck continued on its 
course, there would have been no impact 
as there would be at least 10 teet between 
the respondent and the le~t side of the 
appellant's truck as they pe.seed. Certn 1n.ly, 
in this sense it cannot be said that the 
respondent was running directly into the 
path of the .ahicle. 
This court in its opinion has further 
contondod that the respondent placed himself 
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in tl1e course he knew the appellant's tr\)Ck 
would have to take to avoid a collision. 
This assumes that in orcter to avoi~~ a 
collision there \-:as no other l'Ol~so~1uble 
course open to t11e driver of tbo appo1la:nt 's 
truck than to suddenly swerve r:..~o1J ~i~he 
south side of the highw&J. clear ovor to 
I 
the north edge of the paved road- ~t a polrrt 
140 feet west of .!t.ille pal"kad truck. rve 
subt1it that this is not a reasonable 
in·cerpretation of either the facts or tr1e 
law., As we have 3ean in o1.1.r disoa.ss ion 
under Point 2., ·tlle d.ri ver of tl1e appellant t s 
truck should have seen the parlred tr11cl! 
at a distance o:r at loas.t 350 feet and 
should have been able to stop witb.:Ln that 
distance. The ~esp')ndent ·sest:tfj.ed tbat. 
would ha.'1e to turn to the left, but 
expeeted th~t it would stop as it co·uld 
have do r:e, (R. 146). T't.cro r!ns ample 
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round that the respondent acted as a reason-
able man in assuming that the appellant'• 
truck would not have to turn to the left 
but would stop berore reaching the parked 
truck as it was required b~ law to do, if 
such action was necessaFY~ 
Assuming for the purpose or a.~gument 
that the appellant's truck would have to 
turn to the left to avoid a collision, 
nonetheless, there was eertainly no reason 
to expect that it would suddenly swer-ve 
from the south side of tr1e highway clear· 
over to the north edge or the paved. road 
to avoid a vehicle Which was 140 feet distan-t, 
140 feet is almost one quarter of a Salt Lake 
City block,. and certainly the jury could 
have found that the respondent acted as .a 
reasonable individual in assuming that the 
oncoming vehicle would not suddenly swerve 
from its course elear over to the north 
side or the road to avoid an object a quarter 
ot a block away. There is, of course, ample 
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evidence to sustain a sudden swerving 
because ot the testimor17 that the appe~lant 's 
truck was on tho south side of' the road 
when the brakes were applied, (R. 219)~ 
and the additional testimour that the 
~espondent was ori ~he extl:'erJe north edge ot 
the paved road, (R. lll, 153~54), and tha 
testimony from another witness as to the 
brake marks that they zig•·sagged back and 
forth across the highway, (R. lSS). Under 
the evidence in this case there was no 
reason for a sudden swerve. The truek 
could have stonned on the aoutl1 side before . . . 
reaching the stalled vehicle or it could 
have proceeded either on the south half 
or even in the middle of the road until 
it safely passed the respondent and still 
had 140 .feet within which to move over 
entirely on the nol"'th halt of the road to 
pass the parked vehicle. 
CO!rCLTTSION 
It is undiaputed that the responctant 
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in this case was seriouslJ and permanently 
injttred. Bet' ore depriving him of the ,: '·. 
jury's award, we feel that this court should 
reexand!16 its decision. If ·!;he preser1t 
decision is allowed to stand, in our opinion, 
a gross miscarriage of justice will result 
and the respondent .will have 11otl1ing for 
his pain, s:lffsring and injuries. It is, 
therefore, respectfully Sllbmitt.ed that the 
petition for rehearing should be eranted. 
Respect~ul17 subMitted~ 
RICf: D: STROl~G, 
Attorno;ts :ror Plnin.tiff 
and Respondent 
.1 ,1 
,i ,.i 
I, I 1,1 ~ ~ ~\  
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